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ARTICLE 
 
For most indebted countries in the Middle East and throughout the "Third World", a recurring 
theme is that of economic adjustment and liberalization, often at the behest of the dominant 
economic and financial institutions of the global political economy. From a political perspective 
what is most interesting, and most troubling, about economic adjustment programs is their 
frequent correlation with political instability and unrest. For that reason, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) has long remained one of the most controversial institutions on the world 
stage. To some governments, it represents a key source of financial survival, to others a hated 
and powerful economic overseer akin to a thuggish loan shark. It is the latter more pejorative 
image of the IMF that seems to resonate more clearly with the general public throughout Africa, 
Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. This negative image is certainly due in large part to the 
social and political costs associated with economic adjustment. And the Jordanian experience 
with IMF austerity and adjustment programs has done nothing to soften that image.  
 
In April 1989, the Jordanian government implemented an IMF-sponsored economic-adjustment 
and austerity plan, which had violent results. Riots erupted and then spread across the country. 
Seven years later, in August 1996, the Jordanian government once again complied with IMF 
guidelines, leading to another political upheaval. While the two incidents appear identical in 
terms of government policy and public response, they differ considerably in terms of the state's 
reaction to the unrest. In 1989 the Hashemite regime scrambled to make concessions, but in the 
more recent instability the king stood behind the government, offered no concessions and, to 
the contrary, threatened to use any means necessary to quell the disturbances.  
 
This paper analyzes the connections between economic adjustment and political instability in 
the Jordanian context, with particular emphasis on the startling differences in Hashemite regime 
responses to the upheavals of 1989 and 1996.(1) Drawing on field research and interviews with 
Jordanian policy makers (conducted in 1992, 1993 and 1997), I argue that the key difference is 
that Jordan has undergone a wholesale domestic and international realignment since 1989. The 
1989 and 1996 austerity measures, in short, are part of the same broad program of economic 
and even political restructuring in Jordan since the late eighties. But since this is a cumulative 
process of political as well as economic adjustment, the domestic and international 
circumstances for the regime had changed considerably between 1989 and 1996. Economic-
adjustment measures, therefore, must be seen as intricately linked to Jordan's domestic political 
changes as well as to its foreign-policy shifts (including peace with Israel). Taken together, 
these policies are intended to ensure the long-term survival of the Hashemite regime in a post-
Cold War, post-Gulf War, and even post-King Hussein world. It is the very success of this 
comprehensive "realignment" process, then, that explains the different government reactions to 
unrest in 1989 and 1996.  
 
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT AND POLITICAL UNREST, 1989  
 
Although Jordan's 1989 austerity program was implemented in April of that year, the roots of the 
policy may be found earlier in the 1970s and 1980s in Jordan's incorporation into the regional 
political economy of oil. Following the first oil shock in 1973, the regional petroleum economy 
had boomed, yielding ample opportunities for small states like Jordan to have access to Gulf 
labor markets and sources of foreign aid. But when the regional economy began to contract in 
the 1980s, the net result for Jordan was a decline in labor remittances and in Arab foreign aid 
financed through petrodollars. Jordan's economy has, for the kingdom's entire history, been 
dependent on various sources of foreign aid, including that from the United Kingdom and later 
from the United States.(2) But the oil revolution that transformed the regional political economy 
affected Jordan too. Although not an oil producer itself, Jordan had become increasingly 
dependent on the regional political economy of oil by virtue of its main export: people. 
Palestinian and Jordanian workers flocked to the Gulf states to work the oil fields as skilled 
laborers and to fill key professional positions from engineers to bankers to teachers. The 
kingdom came to rely more and more on these Gulf connections as a source of Jordanian 
employment, labor remittances, and considerable Arab foreign aid to Jordan as a frontline state 
in the conflict with Israel. At the 1978 Baghdad summit of the Arab League, for example, 
wealthy Arab states promised to extend far more aid to Jordan, largely to ensure that the 
kingdom would not follow Egyptian President Anwar Sadat's lead in signing a separate peace 
with Israel.(3) Jordan may not have had peace, but the regime and to some extent the society 
benefited from the oil boom of the 1970s and hoped it would continue into the 1980s.  
 
But as the eighties began, the global economy was still reeling from the effects of the oil shock 
that followed the Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the onset of the Iran-Iraq War the following 
year. This economic jolt, combined with global changes in oil markets, signaled the beginning of 
a contraction of the oil economy. For Jordan, this resulted not only in declining labor 
remittances, but also in a decline in Arab bilateral aid, just as the kingdom's economic planners 
had established higher levels of government spending.(4) With increasing shortfalls in the 
national budget throughout the 1980s, Jordan resorted to more and more external borrowing. As 
remittances and aid declined, the national debt steadily rose. By 1988, Jordan's debt was twice 
its Gross Domestic Product (GDP).  
 
Some early halting attempts at minor economic restructuring had begun by the mid-eighties, but 
it was not until March of 1989 that the government of Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifaai felt 
compelled to turn to the IMF and the World Bank to renegotiate and reschedule Jordan's debt 
payments.(5) The depth of the economic crisis became clear as Jordan stopped making 
payments on bilateral government loans. This emergency economic measure was announced in 
March; the regime had no choice but to seek new terms for its debt repayments. IMF 
assistance, however, does not come without strings attached, in this case a five-year plan for 
economic adjustment and stabilization. In return, the IMF agreed to grant Jordan $125 million in 
credit in addition to more than $100 million in loan money to come from the World Bank over a 
two-year period. The IMF's main concern was with Jordan's enormous budget deficit. The 
austerity plan, therefore, included in its key provisions steps to cut government expenditures as 
dramatically as possible.(6)  
 
While Jordan's raw economic indicators make clear the regime's increasingly dire economic 
position, a number of other factors are also worthy of note. To some extent, the economic 
constraints themselves helped compel the regime to make some significant foreign-policy 
adjustments, spurred on by developments beyond the kingdom itself. In 1987, for example, the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip exploded into active resistance against Israeli occupation in what 
came to be known as the intifada. As the violence and unrest in the occupied territories 
continued, King Hussein finally acceded to the policy recommendations of many top Jordanian 
policy makers by formally renouncing the monarchy's claims to the West Bank. At least some of 
the those who urged the king to sever the West Bank ties argued that such a move was 
necessary to allow the regime to focus on political consolidation and economic renewal in what 
they viewed as "Jordan proper".(7)  
 
In 1989, Jordan also announced the formation of a new Arab political alignment and economic 
bloc -- the Arab Cooperation Council (majlis al-taawun al-arabi) -- made up of Jordan, Iraq, 
Egypt and North Yemen (later unified Yemen). The formation of the ACC was motivated by 
several factors, among these the need to deepen economic relations with Egypt and Iraq, and to 
band together four economically indebted states as a kind of collective lobby group for aid from 
the Gulf states.(8) While the ACC had motivations in domestic politics and strategic concerns, in 
other words, it was also seen by the Jordanian regime as one more step toward political and 
economic restructuring for the kingdom's long-term survival.(9) Within months of the formation 
of the new political-economic alignment, the regime implemented its austerity program with 
unexpectedly violent results.  
 
The public response to the austerity measures and the resultant price hikes was swift and 
dramatic. Prices rose sharply for such goods as fuel, hard and soft beverages, and cigarettes. 
Rioting began in the town of Maan, in the south, resulting in police intervention. At least 17 
people were injured in the melee that ensued.(10) The high level of public anger, however, was 
not aimed just at the latest government economic austerity policies. Rather, the austerity 
program might better be seen as the final straw for many Jordanians. Public discontent focused 
on broader and more endemic issues such as long-term political and economic 
mismanagement. Even before the 1989 riots, the person and government of Prime Minister 
Zayd al-Rifaai had come to be associated in the public mind with cronyism and corruption. And 
it was Rifaai who would bear the brunt of public anger once the unrest began. For many years 
after the 1989 riots, Rifaai -- whose father and grandfather had, like him, served many times 
each as prime minister -- had still not returned to any cabinet post, much less to the prime 
ministry. (He did, however, receive a royal appointment to Jordan's upper house of parliament 
following the 1997 elections).  
 
Although the austerity plan triggered riots in many parts of Jordan, some good can be said to 
have come of the otherwise negative events. Specifically, the widespread social unrest provided 
the main impetus for substantive and even rapid movement in the long-discussed political 
liberalization process. Since at least 1984 the government had promised much but delivered 
little. In a sign of just how shaken the regime was by the April riots, the government was sacked 
and new elections were announced for November that same year. These were the first full 
parliamentary elections in Jordan in more than 20 years. Although political parties would not be 
legalized until 1993, previously underground leftist and nationalist parties began to reemerge 
into Jordanian public life, and many secular and even more Islamist opposition figures were 
elected to the lower house of the Jordanian parliament in November 1989.(11)  
 
In the years that followed, the government relaxed restrictions on the media, lifted martial law, 
allowed for the legalization of political parties, and continued the process of parliamentary 
elections in 1993 and later in 1997. In sum, despite the social and political damage wrought by 
the IMF program and the riots that followed, Jordan also entered a new era in its political life 
with a riot-induced process of limited democratization.  
 
ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT, 1996  
 
In August 1996, the Jordanian government implemented its second major economic adjustment 
program, again in cooperation with the IMF. The motivation this time around was not as dire as 
that surrounding the 1989 austerity measures. Rather, the new round of economic changes 
amounted simply to the second phase of the original program. Much had occurred in the years 
between 1989 and 1996. From 1989 to 1991, the kingdom had reeled under economic hardship, 
domestic unrest, and a regional crisis in which Jordan's attempt at a middle ground had lost it 
the economic support of the Gulf states and its Western allies. But in the second three-year 
period, 1992-94, the kingdom had realigned just as dramatically, stabilizing its economic 
situation, abandoning its political alignment with Iraq (and permitting Iraqi opposition to organize 
in Jordan), achieving rapprochement with the United States and even most Gulf states, and 
signing the peace treaty with Israel.(12)  
 
Having recovered from the domestic and regional crises that marked the beginning of the 
decade and having consolidated its key international political and economic relationships, the 
regime turned again toward domestic economic adjustment. The Jordanian government had, in 
effect, agreed to sign on as an enthusiastic participant in the post-Cold War and post-Gulf War 
"New World Order," which appeared to be predicated on at least nominal political liberalization 
and also on more significant levels of economic liberalization. In its attempts to streamline its 
budget and bring its deficit more completely under control, the Jordanian government chose to 
focus once again on the bane of the IMF and other international creditors: domestic subsidies. 
The decision to target the bread subsidy in particular was also influenced by the abrupt rise in 
international wheat prices in 1995 from $175 to $280 per ton.(13)  
 
Since the 1996 program emerged in a less constrained economic atmosphere than the earlier 
round of adjustments, it is particularly noteworthy that the public response so closely resembled 
that of 1989, with riots in the streets and calls for the government's resignation. This is perhaps 
still more intriguing when one considers that, unlike the abrupt austerity measures of 1989, the 
1996 version appeared to approach in slow motion. National attention had been focused on 
impending new economic austerity measures for weeks before they were actually implemented. 
The economic adjustment program had, in fact, been the main focus of media attention and 
parliamentary debates. Indeed, the prime minister himself had made a point of holding a news 
conference as early as July 11, 1996, to explain his policy decisions and allay public fears.  
 
The message of the news conference, however, appeared to change as it wore on. At first, 
Prime Minister Kabariti seemed to indicate that no changes at all were to occur:  
 
   The government will not lift the subsidy given to Jordanian citizens. The 
   government will not lift the subsidy to the Jordanian citizens as long as I 
   have the honor of being in charge. I stress to you that this subsidy will 
   not be affected at all and that citizens will not bear any additional 
   burden to obtain their daily bread.(14) 
At first, this seemed to indicate that the government had abandoned its plan to lift the subsidy; 
however, Kabariti was carefully allowing for the subsidy to be removed, so long as it was not 
"affected" and so long as Jordanians were in some way compensated. In response to a 
reporter's question, the prime minister modified his point to say that "there will be no lifting of the 
bread subsidy without supporting the citizens in return for this decision." And still later, he stated 
that "there will be a lifting of the bread subsidy, and the citizen will be paid the difference in 
prices, and this difference will exceed the increase in prices."(15) The press conference itself 
reflected the careful approach that the government attempted to take, by shifting even in its own 
use of language from outright denials that there would be any change, to vague allusions to 
minor levels of change, to stressing that, yes, there would be a change, but citizens would be 
amply compensated for it.  
 
The government, in short, did indeed have every intention of doing away with the subsidy, but it 
also had a plan to soften the blow on the Jordanian public. Prime Minister Kabariti attempted to 
make the compensation plan as clear as possible:  
 
   Let me explain the mechanism. We will pay the difference in the price of 
   bread to all civil servants, the Armed Forces and the government, through a 
   cost-of-living allowance. This will become part of the state budget. There 
   will be legislation to show that there is a cost-of-living allowance 
   equivalent to the percentage we will pay to the citizen: 1.28 Jordanian 
   dinars for each member of the family regardless of age. Those who do not 
   work in the public sector and the Armed Forces and those who have ration 
   cards will be paid through the Supply Ministry or the Jordanian Banks.(16) 
He added that any who did not have ration cards would be able to apply for them and that the 
government had no intention of excluding Palestinians in the various refugee camps in Jordan. 
The very fact that the government bothered to hold a press conference at all reflected the 
changes in Jordan's political liberalization process since the previous economic crisis.  
 
What was perhaps the most striking part of the news conference, however, was not the banter 
between the prime minister and reporters, but rather the personal intervention of King Hussein. 
While Kabariti was speaking, the king entered the room and literally as well as symbolically 
stood behind his prime minister. The king later made clear his support for Kabariti's economic 
reform efforts, even referring directly to the 1989 riots and appealing for public cooperation with 
the economic adjustment process in order to avoid a repeat of the earlier unrest. In an equally 
important substantive and symbolic move, the king also made a point of paying a high-profile 
visit to the headquarters of the Jordanian armed forces to discuss the same issue and make 
clear his support for the government's decisions.(17)  
 
While the government did attempt to provide ample warning of its impending economic changes 
and even some level of compensation, the real effects on ordinary Jordanians were nonetheless 
severe. Compensation or not, the fact remained that bread prices more than doubled, and 
people feared that when prices stabilized they might amount to as much as a 300-percent 
increase. The compensation program itself was also problematic, since the approximately $1.80 
per-Jordanian per-month allowance was essentially offset by similar increases in the prices of 
dairy products. Wheat prices, in short, had affected not only bread, but also animal fodder and 
thus indirectly dairy prices as well.(18)  
 
Before the implementation of the economic adjustment program, parliament took up the issue of 
the bread and fodder subsidies in its special summer session. The opposition bloc of 23 Islamist 
deputies, 16 of whom were members of the Islamic Action Front (IAF), strongly opposed the 
government's plan to lift the subsidy and decided to boycott parliamentary sessions that the 
prime minister was to attend. In their absence, Prime Minister Kabariti railed against them, 
referring to the boycott itself as a form of "corruption."(19) The Islamists, in turn, condemned the 
government as incompetent and unresponsive to parliament and called for the prime minister to 
resign. But ultimately the IAF boycott tactic failed. The Islamists had intended to deny the prime 
minister the needed quorum for any parliamentary votes, but the voting proceeded without the 
IAF deputies and their allies. In the subsequent motion against the government's price hikes on 
bread and fodder, only 23 of 52 deputies voted for the alternative proposal offered by 
parliament's own committee. Ironically perhaps, if the IAF deputies had shown up, their 
additional 23 votes would have reversed the vote outcome.(20)  
 
 
DEJA VU? THE PUBLIC RESPONSE, 1996  
 
Within a few days of the implementation of the new adjustment program, Jordanians began to 
feel the effects of the price increases. With the lifting of the subsidy, the cost of bread had more 
than doubled. Again people took to the streets and again the riots began in areas that were not 
hotbeds of Palestinian nationalist or Jordanian Islamist activity (the two traditional foci of 
opposition in Jordan). Rather, as with the 1989 riots, the violence began in towns in the south of 
Jordan that have long been viewed as strongholds of support for King Hussein and his regime. 
The demonstrations began in Kerak but soon spread to Mean and Tafila, and later even to the 
downtown market area of Amman itself. In Kerak, demonstrations turned violent as police 
intervened. The vision of demonstrators and riot police clashing invoked for many Jordanians 
the imagery of the intifada in the occupied territories, complete with stones flying in one direction 
and tear gas canisters in the other. Indeed, for many Jordanians, the king's televised speech 
threatening to use an "iron fist" to put down "sedition" also recalled the intifada.(21) The 
government soon called in the regular army, and armored vehicles began to roll down the 
streets of Kerak as the army imposed a curfew on the city. Before the unrest came to an end, 
the rioters had turned their anger on targets that seemed to reflect public hostility toward 
economic privation and government power. The damages here were not to individuals but to 
property. The demonstrators set fire to several government offices, a private bank and 
numerous cars.(22)  
 
In sum, the public response to economic austerity was strikingly similar in 1989 and in 1996. But 
although the implementation of the IMF-sponsored adjustment program in 1996 resembles the 
events of 1989, the broader economic circumstances were still significantly different. The 
macroeconomic indicators in 1989, as discussed above, showed that Jordan's debt was twice 
its GDP and its budget and balance of payments deficits were virtually out of control. By 1996, 
however, these economic figures had been trimmed down considerably; the kingdom's 
macroeconomic picture showed a fairly clean bill of health.  
 
Why, then, did the new program elicit similar levels of hostility and violence on the part of the 
public? One key reason may be found still within the context of the aggregate economic 
indicators themselves -- not for what they say, but for what they do not say. For although 
Jordan's economic statistics were far more robust in 1996 than they had been in 1989, they do 
not reveal that the reduced budget deficit had resulted in part from reduced government 
spending in specific areas. But this meant in practical terms that public-sector salaries had not 
increased significantly and that they had certainly not kept up with the cost of living. In addition, 
the tightened government budget had resulted in fewer available public-sector jobs. Following 
its first IMF adjustment program, the kingdom had managed to appeal to more foreign investors, 
again padding the economic statistics. But the fact remained that many of the visible effects of 
increased investment remained confined to middle-class and upscale neighborhoods in Amman 
and were certainly not felt in towns in the south like Kerak, Maan and Tafila.  
 
Just as the economy appeared to be looking up, according to the aggregate statistics, many 
Jordanians found -- often for the first time -- that they had to commute to the capital to find work. 
And since the Gulf War, the usual external safety valves such as labor migration to the Gulf or 
jobs in export industries connected to Iraq were largely cut off. Nor had the peace treaty with 
Israel made up for these losses. The peace had been marketed to the public as the source of a 
coming investment and trade boon, but the real results were minimal and, again, restricted 
largely to the capital.(23) It is not a coincidence, therefore, that the riots occurred in places 
largely left out of Jordan's improving economic fortunes.  
 
THE GOVERNMENT RESPONSE, 1996  
 
In response to the political upheaval, the government dispatched security forces immediately, 
clashing with demonstrators. By the time the regular army moved in and the demonstrations had 
been brought under control, numerous arrests had been made. The government claimed that 
only 120 people were detained, while Kerak residents interviewed by Western reporters put the 
number at closer to 500 for their city alone. King Hussein went on television threatening to use 
an "iron fist" and any other means necessary to restore order.(24) The king also made a veiled 
threat regarding broader penalties in terms of the political liberalization process itself, by 
describing himself as uneasy over the state of Jordanian "democracy" and suggesting that it 
was being used by subversives as a shield for their activities.(25)  
 
But in addition to resorting to outright coercion, the king also attempted to appease public 
frustration by traveling immediately to each of the cities involved in the riots. In Kerak, the king 
was greeted with chants of "Long live the king, and down with Kabariti!" reflecting -- as in the 
earlier riots -- public wrath at the head of government, but not at the head of state. Just as Prime 
Minister Rifaai was blamed for the economic hardship in 1989, Prime Minister Kabariti bore the 
brunt of public anger in 1996.(26) This is not to say that none of the anger was reserved for the 
king. Far from it, but at least at the public level -- and in the king's presence -- it was the prime 
minister who was the target. To some extent, the king enjoyed greater political legitimacy in 
1996 than he had in 1989, still drawing in part on his popular stance during the Gulf War and the 
opening of the political system to limited amounts of democratization. But none of the economic 
and political changes of the 1990s had panned out to meet the full expectations of the public. 
Thus one should not underestimate the level of public dissatisfaction with the unfulfilled promise 
of economic change, political liberalization and peace.  
 
Still, from street demonstrators to members of parliament, calls abounded for the prime 
minister's resignation. But unlike the 1989 riots, this prime minister was not immediately sacked. 
To the contrary, Kabariti vociferously defended his economic policies as necessary medicine for 
the Jordanian economy and steadfastly refused to resign. Unlike Zayd al-Rifaai, Kabariti found 
himself publicly defended by the king himself. The king stated his support not only for the prime 
minister, but also for his economic policies, suggesting that the previous years of bread 
subsidies had been "a mistake."(27)  
 
As the government and the monarchy closed ranks, the king, prime minister and other 
government officials also made it a point to focus the blame on outside agitators, internal 
subversives with foreign ties, and even on Saddam Hussein himself. The king suggested on 
television that pro-Iraqi Jordanians were at work. Similarly, Prime Minister Kabariti argued that 
"the Iraq Baath party was somehow very much involved in fomenting the riot that started in 
Kerak." And another government official noted that "it is no secret that President Saddam 
Hussein would like to undermine Jordan's stability and that Iraq has many supporters in Jordan 
waiting for the right moment to move."(28) The government thus charged that these subversives 
had indeed made their move. During a special meeting with members of parliament, the king 
continued the theme of local elements with foreign ties in which he disparaged the "old schools 
of the 1950s." In fleshing out this apparent allusion to Pan-Arab nationalist intrigues, the king 
added that "one cannot be a good citizen if he or she lacks a sense of national belonging."(29) 
Lower-level government officials would take that point further, suggesting that the rioters were 
simply acting "anti-Jordanian."(30)  
 
The government's focus then shifted, perhaps inevitably, to the Jordanian Arab Socialist Baath 
party, the pro-Iraqi version of that party in Jordan, which had won one of the 80 seats in the 
1993 parliamentary elections. The party's member of parliament, Khalil Haddadin, denied any 
involvement by the party but noted that many Baath party members were detained by security 
forces.(31) In interviews with the press, party spokesperson Ahmad al-Najdawi noted the 
ideological affinity between the Jordanian and Iraqi Baath parties, but strongly denied any 
political connections to Baghdad and any role in fomenting the bread riots.(32)  
 
But the Baath was not the only group that found itself to be the target of the government sweep. 
According to at least one analyst, the majority of detainees were leftists and nationalists of 
various types. Surprisingly, another source of opposition was treated almost benignly in the 
government crack-down: the Islamists. In his televised speech, the king had even suggested 
that the Islamist opposition had behaved responsibly, unlike the allegedly pro-Iraqi and/or leftist 
demonstrators. Yet the Islamists had been among the regime's most vocal opponents before 
the bread subsidy was even lifted, and they would soon prove themselves to be less than pliant 
in the upheaval that followed.(33) Despite what may have been an attempt on the part of the 
regime to split the opposition between secular left and religious right, both wings of the 
parliamentary opposition banded together to demand the return of the bread subsidy and the 
resignation of the Kabariti government.  
 
The government, however, pushed forward even months after the riots with its accusations of 
external links to Jordanian parties and, significantly, focused on the main secular leftist parties: 
the Jordanian Arab Socialist Baath party, the Progressive Arab Baath party, the Democratic 
Popular Unity party, and the People's Democratic party (better known as Hashd). Specifically, 
the government accused each of the four parties of violating the Political Parties Law, which 
prohibits parties from maintaining foreign links and from receiving funding from abroad.(34) The 
government followed through with its accusations by bringing law suits against each of them, 
the four main secular-left parties in the 11-party opposition bloc in the parliament. The bloc itself 
was led by the Islamic Action Front, but the IAF was essentially excluded from the government's 
criticism and from legal charges. Yet the opposition front essentially held together, and in the 
wake of the August 1996 riots Islamists, leftists and pan-Arab nationalists continued to call for 
the resignation of the government.  
 
Rather than acceding to parliamentary opposition demands for the sacking of the government, 
the king instead dissolved the current session of parliament, thereby denying the opposition the 
parliamentary floor as a forum for criticizing the government. Thus unlike Rifaai, Kabariti did 
manage to hang on for many months after the 1996 crisis. But by 1997 he may have become 
too much of liability for the government to get anything done, and the king eventually replaced 
him with the same man that he had succeeded: Abd al-Salam al-Majali. Mr. Majali, however, 
soon found that he too would have considerable difficulty dealing with an increasingly 
recalcitrant parliamentary opposition. Yet the economic adjustment program remained in place.  
 
 
CONCLUSIONS  
 
The comparison between the IMF riots of 1989 and 1996 shows that although the economic 
plans were similar and public hostility and the riots themselves were virtually identical, 
nonetheless the state's reactions varied considerably. In 1989 the king had made a point of 
being out of the country when the IMF austerity measures were implemented, only to return to 
severe social unrest. The king's distance from the events, calculated or not, allowed the 
monarchy as well as the public to place the blame on bungling by the Rifaai government. But 
the monarchy had been clearly and deeply shaken by the depth of public anger and quickly 
made a series of concessions: sacking the prime minister, reshuffling the cabinet, and perhaps 
most important, calling new elections for the first time in more than 20 years. In 1996, in 
contrast, the regime maintained its support for the prime minister and his government as well as 
its "iron fist" policy in putting down the riots. In addition, the monarchy made repeated charges 
of external subversion and internal sedition, with particular focus on secular leftist political 
parties. In the 1989 riots, these parties still operated underground. But in 1996, as legal parties, 
many with seats in parliament, they found themselves the targets of government law suits over 
alleged illegal "foreign links."  
 
In 1989, at least some good came of the political explosion, since it was the catalyst for more 
genuine attempts at liberalization and democratization. But in 1996, even though the regime 
managed to weather the political unrest, serious questions remained. For the government 
stayed its course on economic adjustment, despite public and parliamentary opposition. 
Jordan's more open and dynamic press in many cases criticized the government considerably in 
1996, in contrast to the wholesale subservience of the Jordanian media in the earlier crisis. Yet 
the very openness and depth of the stinging criticisms of government policy -- regarding 
economic austerity and also relations with Israel -- proved too hard-hitting for the monarchy, 
which by the late summer of 1997 had pushed through a series of measures to stifle media 
criticism through elastic and vague rules about "national security" matters. For the most part, 
however, the regime appeared to see the crisis as over by the fall of 1996. But here lies the 
main disconnect between the regime and the people. For many in the public saw the riots as 
symptomatic not only of economic concerns, but also of something bigger.  
 
Jordan had, between 1989 and 1996, realigned its international position considerably. The 
regime that had won so much public support for its stance during the Gulf War had now become 
a sharp critic of the Saddam Hussein regime, allowing Iraqi opposition groups and even high-
ranking exiles refuge in the kingdom. In addition, Jordan had mended all fences with the West, 
achieved rapprochement with most Gulf monarchies, and concluded a full peace treaty with 
Israel. Jordan, in short, had realigned itself wholesale. toward Western and pro-Western states 
and had; in effect, signed on as an enthusiastic participant in the neoliberal world order. Its 
acceptance of the norms of this new world order -- some level of political liberalization, free 
markets, privatization, and economic adjustment -- earned it the praise and support of the 
world's key financial institutions (and Jordan's main creditors) from the IMF to the Paris Club.  
 
From the government's perspective, this realignment was entirely successful. But for many in 
Jordanian society, the regime's policies too often sounded like a sellout. Just as many at the top 
of the regime felt more comfortable and secure than ever, the riots should have provided 
another wake-up call to the effect that the rest of the country did not share this optimistic view. 
The disconnect becomes clearer if we consider that regime officials appear to believe that 
economic adjustment is non-negotiable and that political liberalization has essentially run its 
course; whereas many outside of government see economic adjustment as having gone too far 
already and political liberalization as only just beginning. This difference in views of the past, 
present and future of the kingdom was reflected in the 1996 riots, but it is important to note that 
this is not over. Indeed, the opposition boycott of the November 1997 elections suggested that 
the disconnect continues. And the later 1998 riots in Maan over Jordan's role in yet another 
U.S.-Iraqi crisis only underscored the deeper tensions within the kingdom.  
 
The precariousness of state-society relations within Jordan is rendered all the more salient 
given the continuing illness of King Hussein and the looming prospect of political succession 
within the kingdom. Veteran observers of Jordanian politics might reasonably note, of course, 
that both the king and indeed the country itself can be considered among the great "survivors" 
of Middle East politics. That is undoubtedly true. It is also true that nothing lasts forever. The key 
issue today, therefore, is simply to recognize the nature of the challenges facing Jordan at the 
turn of the century. The regime and its opposition clearly have different views of Jordan's needs. 
But the 1996 riots were symptomatic of anger and resentment over far more than the price of 
bread.(35) It is difficult, in fact, to overestimate the depth of disillusionment within Jordan 
regarding the economy, the political liberalization process, and peace with Israel. If the 
Hashemite regime assumes that the "bread riots" were only about bread, it may do so at its own 
peril.  
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